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AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL APPROACH
TO TAX REFORM
PAT BRYAN
SANDY CRAIG
Nothing would be done at all if a man waited till he could do it so
well that no one could find fault with it.
Cardinal Newman
PURPOSE
A. Taxation-An Intergovernmental Approach
Political theorists have long taught us that the power upon which
government must be based is the power to tax. Consequently, it
should come as no surprise that each of the more than 80,000 state
and local governmental units which make up the United States clings
dearly to its individual taxing system. Considering the complexity of
these systems together with the remarkable growth in government,1
it is no wonder that the American taxpayer pleads for meaningful tax
reform.2 There is no dearth of suggested solutions in answer to the
taxpayers' cries for help. Suggestions range from very specific pro-
posals such as changing the depletion allowances granted to extrac-
tive industries to such far reaching proposals as the adoption of a
comprehensive tax base. At all levels of government, politicians talk
of tax reform for their constituency: federal income tax reform,
state sales tax reform, and local property tax reform.
It is the thesis of this paper that taxing systems can no longer be
considered individually; that the now prevalent approach to reform,
fragmented and isolated within each level of government, is of itself a
major impediment to meaningful change. The reform of a local tax-
ing system may have serious adverse consequences on a state taxing
system, and vice versa. Similarly, federal tax reform affects state
1. In 1929 governmental spending accounted for only one-tenth (1/10) of the gross
national product. Now, in 1974, governmental spending is responsible for approximately
one-third (1/3) of the gross national product. For a discussion of the reasons for the growth
of the public sector, see Bird, Wagner's "Law "of Expanding State Activity, Public Finance/
Finances Publiques (1971).
2. In 1970-71 taxes accounted for 67.8% of all (federal, state and local) governmental
revenues. An additional 16.8% of the total revenues were insurance trust revenues (com-
monly called payroll taxes). Although there are other governmental revenue sources, the
scope of this article is limited to tax revenues. Figures taken from U.S. Bureau of the
Census, Governmental Finances in 1970-71, 4 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Governmental
Finances].
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taxing systems in a multitude of ways. What is needed is an inter-
governmental taxing system which is flexible enough to serve all
levels of government -federal, state and local. Although fiscal auton-
omy is the cornerstone on which federalism must be built, tax re-
form at one level of government cannot be realistically accomplished
without corresponding revision of taxing systems at the other levels
of government. In short, meaningful reform can only be accom-
plished by considering all taxing systems as a whole.
B. The Problems: Fiscal Imbalance and Federal Pre-Emption
The present taxing system exemplifies the need for an intergovern-
mental approach. Since the Korean War, many state and local govern-
ments have been confronted with continual fiscal crisis. This crisis
has been described by Professor Gerald Boyle3 as fiscal imbalance.
Fiscal imbalance, in the case of state and local governments, occurs
when the income elasticity of their revenue structure is less than that
of their expenditure structure. Income elasticity is a measure of the
responsiveness of taxes to changes in gross national product (herein-
after GNP). If an increase of 10% in the GNP is accompanied by a
10% rise in the proceeds of a particular tax (with no rate change),
that tax is said to have an income elasticity of 1. If the tax is inelastic
(income elasticity of less than 1), the percentage change in tax yield
is less than the percentage change in GNP. The reverse is true if the
tax is elastic. For example, a tax which has an elasticity of 1.5 is
considered to be elastic and will produce a 15% increase in tax re-
ceipts if the GNP increases 10%.
Professor Boyle calculated the income elasticity of normal growth
in state and local expenditures for the years 1956-1966 to be 1.1
while he calculated normal growth in state and local revenues to be
only 0.9 over the same period. During that 10 year period state and
local aggregate tax revenues due to normal growth equaled approx-
imately $18.2 billion as compared to aggregate expenditures due to
normal growth of $25.7 billion. The $7.5 billion difference had to be
made up by tax increases or program cutbacks.'
As is evident from the figures above, fiscal imbalance simply de-
scribes the inability of state and local governmental tax structures to
keep pace with their expenditure structures. Since state and local
governments have a tax basis which grows more slowly in relation to
growth in the economy than their expenditures, they are faced with
automatic deficits which force them to make painful and periodic
3. Professor of Economics; Acting Chairperson, Department of Economics, University of
New Mexico.
4. Boyle, The Anatomy of Fiscal Imbalance, 21 Nat'l Tax J. 412 (1968).
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tax increases. Cigarette taxes have been doubled and redoubled and
the sales and property tax rates have skyrocketed since the Korean
War.' The federal government has pumped massive amounts of fed-
eral aid in the form of grants-in-aid and now revenue sharing into
state and local governments in order to ease this crisis of fiscal im-
balance.
Conversely, the federal tax revenue system is highly productive. As
GNP has increased in recent years, federal tax revenues have grown
more quickly than have federal expenditures. The drastic difference
between the productivity of the federal system and that of state and
local governments is due, in large part, to the kinds of taxes the
various governmental levels employ. In fiscal 1970-71, the highly
elastic individual and corporate income taxes made up 82.5% of the
total federal tax revenues. General and selective sales taxes accounted
for 57.4% of total state tax revenues. The property tax was respon-
sible for 84.6% of total local tax revenues during the same period.6
These taxes respond quite differently to growth in the economy.
This response to growth is measured by income elasticity. There is no
consensus among economists as to the proper average elasticities of
given taxes. Elasticities of nearly all taxes will vary over time. Conse-
quently, studies generally describe income elasticities of taxes in
ranges rather than precise figures. The following table lists elasticity
ranges for the major tax sources.
TABLE 1
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ELASTICITIES OF THE MAJOR TAX REVENUES 7
REVENUE SOURCE 1965 ELASTICITY ESTIMATES
LOW MEDIUM HIGH
Income taxes: individual 1.5 1.65 1.8
corporate 1.1 1.2 1.3
Property taxes 0.7 0.9 1.1
Sales taxes: general 0.9 0.97 1.05
motor fuels 0.4 0.5 0.6
tobacco 0.3 0.35 0.4
alcoholic beverages 0.4 0.5 0.6
As is clear from the table, the most productive taxes (those with
the highest income elasticity) are the income taxes, which are
utilized by the federal government. State and local governments are
5. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Federal-State Coordination of
Personal Income Taxes 45 (1965).
6. Governmental Finances, supra note 2, at 5. Note that the Bureau of the Census
categorizes payroll taxes as insurance trust revenues rather than as tax revenues. Conse-
quently the effect of payroll taxes is not taken into account in the figures quoted above.
7. Federal-State Coordination of Personal Income Taxes, supra note 5, at 42.
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left with the less productive property and sales taxes.' This phenom-
enon has been described as federal pre-emption. Because of the high
federal tax rates, state and local governments have been reluctant to
utilize the highly productive income tax.9 Federal tax rates presently
range from 14%-70%. As a matter of practical politics, no state or
local government has been able to enact a broad-based personal in-
come tax with high enough rates to be used as its principal revenue
source." 0 Because of federal pre-emption, state and local govern-
ments have been forced to utilize the inelastic property and sales
taxes to finance their expenditures. These tax sources have been
unable to keep pace with expenditures, thus resulting in fiscal imbal-
ance.
C The Proposal and Its Limitations
An intergovernmental taxing system can solve the interrelated
problems of fiscal imbalance and federal pre-emption without sacri-
ficing state and local autonomy. Tax reform is unavoidable and will
affect all levels of government. Meaningful tax reform can only be
accomplished by considering the needs at all levels of government.
We propose a federal income tax system utilizing a comprehensive
tax base which will basically eliminate present exemptions and de-
ductions. Such a system will have two principal results:
1) it will make possible a greatly reduced rate structure, and;
2) it will create the possibility of changes in the distribution of
economic resources (shifting of the tax burden).
The reduced rate structure will allow state and local taxing sys-
tems to utilize a similar broad-based income tax as their principal tax
revenue source by increasing their income tax rates. Increased utiliza-
tion of the highly elastic income tax by state and local governments
can help to solve the problem of fiscal imbalance. The comprehensive
tax base could also be designed with an eye toward redistribution of
economic resources.' ' A shift in the burden of the taxpayer at the
8. It should be noted that considering the income elasticity of taxes is only viewing the
system from one side. In order to determine the actual effect that a taxing system has on a
taxpayer, it is also necessary to consider income elasticity on the expenditure side. Such a
discussion is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of state and local expenditure
elasticity, see Boyle supra note 4.
9. Federal-State Coordination of Personal Income Taxes, supra note 5, at 15.
10. Only one state, Delaware, has state income tax rates in excess of 15%. As of 1971,
total state personal income taxes accounted for only 10.7% of all state and local tax
revenues. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State-Local Finances: Sig-
nificant Features and Suggested Legislation 201 (1972) [hereinafter cited as State-Local
Finances].
11. For an excellent discussion of distribution of economic resources, see L. Thurow,
The Impact of Taxes on the American Economy (1971).
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federal level could have pronounced effects on the flexibility of state
and local taxing systems. The measurement of the tax burdens of
existing taxing systems is, at best, an inexact science. For purposes of
this article, a discussion of the tax burdens would not be productive
without a more detailed rate structure to work with.
In order to demonstrate an intergovernmental approach in prac-
tice, this article will suggest how New Mexico could restructure its
state and local taxing system in order to take advantage of the fed-
eral reforms. It is our belief that intergovernmental taxing systems
would benefit both individually and collectively from these proposed
reforms.
Having attempted to describe the things that this article hopes to
accomplish, it is equally important to describe the things that it will
not attempt to accomplish. This article does not propose to provide
the reader with an exhaustive survey of tax policy literature and
concepts. Rather, this is an attempt at a readable (and conse-
quently-an oversimplified) approach to tax reform. This article does
not attempt to describe an ideal system of taxation either from an
economic or legal standpoint. Instead, it suggests a practical solution
to a political problem -intergovernmental relations. Finally, the arti-
cle is limited to a discussion of only the major tax sources utilized by
the federal, state and local governments. We recognize that such a
limitation leaves a multitude of questions unanswered. Such ques-
tions have purposely been left to other legal and economic scholars.
It is our aim to present the need for an intergovernmental taxing
system in a concise and readable manner to the citizen/taxpayer.
PERSONAL PREJUDICES
Any proposal for tax reform must necessarily reflect the values of
its authors. Before detailing our suggestions, we will explain the cri-
teria we used in evaluating a taxing system. These principles can be
utilized in resolving problems that may arise from our proposals.
Numerous criteria have been proposed for evaluation of the fed-
eral income tax system.' 2 We have adopted as the most useful and
practical criteria, those suggested by Professor Robert J. Desiderio' '
of the University of New Mexico School of Law. He suggests, in
order of importance: equity, stability, economic growth, simplicity,
and social incentive. For our purposes these have been interpreted
and ordered as follows:
1) Equity. Equity can be measured vertically and horizontally.
12. J. Pechman, Federal Tax Policy 7 (rev. ed. 1971); Sneed, The Criteria of Federal
Income Tax Policy, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 567 (1965).
13. Associate Professor, Associate Dean, University of New Mexico School of Law.
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Vertical equity demands that taxpayers with different incomes pay
different amounts of tax. Vertical equity is consonant with some
redistribution of income. Taxpayers with high incomes pay propor-
tionally more tax than taxpayers with lower incomes, and the tax
revenues can then be used for programs which aid low income fam-
ilies; e.g., welfare. Vertical equity is accomplished through the tax
rates. We favor as a general proposition redistribution of wealth from
"rich" to "poor".'"
Horizontal equity demands that persons with the same income pay
the same amount of tax. Measured this way, equity deals with the
tax base. Horizontal equity is inconsistent with the use of the tax
system to provide incentives for certain activities through exemp-
tions, credits and deductions, etc. This concept also requires treating
all income equally regardless of its source.
2) Simplicity. The need for simplification of present tax laws is
readily apparent to anyone who has encountered them. Over-simplifi-
cation is, of course, not the answer either. A certain degree of com-
plexity in the federal tax structure is unavoidable. Our goal is to
make the mechanical aspects of the taxing system as streamlined as
possible for both the taxpayer and the administrators of the system.
This includes keeping the costs of administration to a minimum.
3) Stability. This concept involves the use of the tax system in
stabilizing a fluctuating economy. Traditionally economic stability
has been defined as: full employment (4% unemployment) and price
level stability (1.5% inflation).' I Economists, most prominently
Musgrave, have noted the necessity of influencing these factors by
manipulating fiscal policy, including tax receipts.'6 Such considera-
tions are important, but are beyond the scope of this paper.
4) Economic Growth. The current taxing system has built into
the tax laws incentives to encourage economic growth; e.g., the in-
vestment credit for businesses,' 7 accelerated depreciation,' ' and the
depletion allowance for extractive industries.' 9 We feel that the tax-
ing system is not the proper means for providing such incentives. If
incentives for economic growth are needed they can be better effec-
tuated through the use of direct expenditures.
2 1
14. We adopt the premise that vertical equity can be accompanied through a progressive
rate scale. Although there are persuasive arguments against progressivity (see Blum &
Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 417 (1952)), space
does not permit fighting that battle here.
15. Pechman, supra note 12, at 8.
16. R. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance 23 (1959).
17. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § § 38, 46-50.
18. Id. § 167.
19. Id. § 613.
20. The total impact of direct expenditures may not be the same as that of tax incentives
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5) Social Incentive. Basically this criterion refers to the use of the
tax laws as an incentive to accomplish purposes which are not neces-
sarily economic. (Similar to "4" above.) Examples of social incen-
tives are incentives to make charitable contributions2" and to pur-
chase insurance.2 2 Incentives are incompatible with horizontal
equity and, as stated with regard to economic incentives, are not a
proper concern of the tax laws.2 3
REFORMING THE FEDERAL TAXING SYSTEM
Our reform proposal will be limited to the income (individual and
corporate), estate and gift taxes. These taxes account for a substan-
tial portion of federal revenues.
TABLE 2
FEDERAL REVENUE 1970-7124
SOURCE AMOUNT PERCENT
(Millions of $) OF TOTAL
Individual Income Tax 86,230 47.1
Corporate Income Tax 26,785 14.6
Insurance Trust Revenues2  45,657 25.0
(Commonly Called Payroll Taxes)
Excise Taxes 16,836 9.2
Estate and Gift Taxes 3,735 2.0
Customs Duties 2,591 1.4
Miscellaneous Receipts 1,100 0.7
TOTAL 182,9-R 100.0
As the second largest source of federal revenue, payroll taxes
(which finance social security and unemployment) cannot be ignored
in attempting to reform the federal tax system. There are many
but no unsolvable problems should result. In some instances, e.g., aid to state and local
governments, direct expenditures have been termed "less costly, more equitable, and more
efficient" than tax incentives. (Interest on state and local bonds is currently excludable
from gross income. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 103) Commission to Revise the Tax Struc-
ture, Reforming the Federal Tax Structure 23 (1973) [hereinafter cited as RFTS].
21. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 170.
22. Id. § § 101, 105, 123.
23. Some authors propose this as a broader criterion of neutrality: that the taxing system
should not act to make one type of economic activity more favorable than any other type.
24. Governmental Finances, supra note 2, at 5.
25. This breaks down into:
(millions of $)
Unemployment 119
Retirement 1,913
Old Age, Survivors, Disability and
Hospital Insurance 41,909
Veteran's Life Insurance 671
Railroad Retirement 1,044
Total 45,657
May 1974]
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proposals for changing the method of financing social security.2 6
Space does not permit discussion of payroll tax reform in this article.
It should be noted, though, that the impact of social security fin-
ancing, whatever method might be adopted, must be considered
before a final tax reform proposal can be formulated.
Our recommendations are taken from an excellent study done by
the Commission to Revise the Tax Structure2 7 (hereinafter CRTS)
which was published in 1973 under the title Reforming the Federal
Tax Structure.2 8 The CRTS proposal contains six major proposi-
tions,2 9 which we endorse:
1) A comprehensive tax base;
2) Elimination of the estate and gift tax;
3) Elimination of the corporate income tax;
4) Establishment of the family-unit as the taxpayer;
5) Allowance of a minimum deduction per family unit;
6) Lower rates for all income levels.
26. Pechman, supra note 12, at 181. Of the reform proposals listed by Pechman, we
favor use of Wneral fund receipts to finance social insurance.
27. Members of the Commission are:
Arthur B. Willis Los Angeles tax attorney
Charles 0. Galvin Dean, School of Law, S.M.U.
Harvey E. Brazer Professor of Economics,
U. of Michigan
Donald Burns C.P.A., Los Angeles
John Mendenhall C.P.A., Washington, D.C.
Chief Investigators for the Committee were:
Dr. David J. Ott Economist, Clark U.
Worcester, Mass.
Dr. Attiat F. Ott Economist, Clark U.
Worcester, Mass.
28. This study, financed by the Fund for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., was
based on a pilot project by the Section on Taxation of the American Bar Association
published in 1969. The CRTS did an exhaustive study of the impact on revenues of the
adoption of a CTB. The study uses computer data extensively and compares results under
present law with results under the CRTS proposed CTB. Estimates are for 1971, based on
the Treasury Department's 1966 Tax File, which is a statistical sample of 80,000 federal
individual income tax returns. This was supplemented with details from the 1967 Survey of
Economic Opportunity (for detailed statistical information see Reforming the Federal Tax
Structure, supra note 20).
The study takes the 1971 adjusted gross income (AGI) and "adds in" (imputes) income
items which would be included in the tax base under the Commission's proposed CTB. The
CRTS CTB, although based on the Haig-Simons definition of income as "increase in net
worth plus consumption," does not exactly parallel our proposal. For purposes of this
article, their data will indicate the approximate revenue impact of our CTB.
The CRTS proposal also includes a family-unit taxpayer, elimination of the estate and gift
tax, elimination of the corporate income tax, allowance of a minimum credit per family
unit, and a lowered rate schedule. Our proposal adopts these features.
29. RFTS, supra note 20, at 7.
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A. A Comprehensive Tax Base
Many authors have advocated (or opposed) the adoption of a com-
prehensive tax base3 0 (hereinafter CTB). The concept of the CTB is
based on what is known as the Haig-Simons definition of income.
Income, under this definition, is equal to net accretions to wealth
plus market value of rights exercised in consumption over a given tax
period. 3' Income, thus, is the capacity of an individual to command
resources. Put into practice as a working definition:
INCOME = NET ACCRETIONS TO
WEALTH + PERSONAL CONSUMPTION
The category Net Accretions to Wealth includes the increase/decrease
in value over the taxable year of all the taxpayer's assets: e.g., realty,
personal property, bank accounts, cash surrender value of life insur-
ance policies. Personal Consumption is personal expenses not for the
production of income. The value of items consumed but not paid for
by the individual is considered here.3 2 The Haig-Simons definition
takes into account the fact that the expenses of producing income
must be netted against the income produced. These expenses are
allowed as "business deductions"3  under the present Internal
Revenue Code. To clarify our proposal, "expenses incurred in the
production of income" (Business Expenses), will be taken into
account in the following manner:
PERSONAL CONSUMPTION = TOTAL
CONSUMPTION - BUSINESS EXPENSES
Our working definition, INCOME = NET ACCRETION TO
WEALTH + PERSONAL CONSUMPTION can serve as a model for a
CTB.3 4 Many legitimate challenges to the CTB can be and have been
posed. A series of examples will show that many of the problems
raised can be solved by reference to a working definition of income
and to the criteria for evaluating taxing systems. The examples center
30. A Comprehensive Income Tax Base? A Debate (1968); RFTS, supra note 20; Studies
in Substantive Tax Reform (A. Willis ed. 1969).
31. Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, The Federal Income Tax
7 (R. Haig ed. 1921); H. Simons, Personal Income Taxation 61-62 (1938).
32. H. Simons, supra note 31, at 50.
33. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162.
34. Professor Bittker las challenged the validity of a basic concept of income, saying that
the only practical approach to .a CTB is to determine, item by item, what is to be included
in the tax base. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, in
A Comprehensive Income Tax Base? A Debate (1968). While a certain number of deviations
from the basic definition will undoubtedly have to be made in creating a workable income
tax based on a CTB, we defend the validity of a working definition, as do Galvin, Musgrave
and Pechman in their debate with Professor Bittker.
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around what Bittker calls "preferences" '3  in the tax law. Preferences
are items currently given special treatment in some way, or not taxed
at all; e.g., capital gains, 36 investment credit,3 ' depletion allow-
ances.
3 8
The following examples are mainly theoretical ones. We have not
attempted to work out the mechanics of a tax return under the CTB
system. It should also be stressed that this proposal is only a model
from which an actual taxing structure could be developed.
1) Imputed Income. Examples of imputed income frequently
cited are: rental value of owner-occupied housing; value of the wife's
housekeeping services; and aid to students in the form of free tuition
or interest free loans. All of these items represent consumption by
the taxpayer which has not been paid for by him.
a) Families A and B live in homes of equal value and earn equal
salaries. A pays $200 a month in rent, and B pays $200 a month on
his home mortgage. Presently, under IRC § 163 taxpayer B may
deduct from his adjusted gross income his interest payments, while
taxpayer A gets no deduction for rental payments. With the CTB
there will be no tax advantage to buying rather than renting a home.
Both families will include the $200 per month payments in their
income as personal consumption.
Once B's home is paid for, he is then receiving the rental value
"free" and, it is argued, he should report imputed income of $200
per month. Up to this point, A and B have paid equal amounts for
housing services of equal value. B, as a homeowner, has expenses in
maintenance, taxes and utilities that A, as a renter, does not. Over a
lifetime, these expenses (and differing advantages) equalize the dif-
ference in the form which A and B have chosen to meet their housing
needs. The $200/month B formerly paid on his mortgage he now
either saves or spends. In either case, he will include the $200/month
in his income. 3 9 The CTB Model System gives no advantage to
homeowners over renters.
35. Bittker, supra note 34, at 1.
36. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § § 1201, 1202.
37. Id. § § 46-50.
38. Id. § 613.
39. Assume that each family has:
$10,000 salary
$ 5,000 living expenses
$ 2,600 savings from salary after expenses and
A spends $2,400 rent
B spends $2,400 or saves it
Assume also that A and B have no other savings or assets.
Family A has income of:
Accretion $2,600 plus Personal Consumption $7,400 = $10,000 Income.
Family B has income of:
[Vol. 4
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b) Assume that in family X H earns $10,000, W earns $0 but
provides housekeeping services valued at $5,000. In family Z H earns
$10,000, W earns $5,000, and they spend $5,000 to purchase house-
keeping services. The argument is made that families X and Z have
the same income and should be taxed as such. This factor can be
accounted for with a CTB in two different ways. One is to add to X's
personal consumption $5,000 representing W's services consumed
but not paid for.40 The second solution which is preferable is to
allow Z to exclude from personal consumption the $5,000 expense
for housekeeping services as business expenses of earning W's in-
come.
4
'
c) Aid to students (free tuition, interest free loans) is merely
added in to Personal Consumption. A and B each earn $10,000 sal-
ary. A pays $2,000/year tuition for one child. B, a faculty member,
gets free tuition for his child. B has thus consumed $2,000/year of
services for which he hasn't paid. This is reflected by adding $2,000
to B's personal consumption. 4 2
2) Insurance. Insurance premiums would be included in the CTB
as Personal Consumption. Interest on ordinary life insurance policy
reserves would be included each year as accretion of the policy's cash
surrender value and would be taxed to the owner of the policy.
Proceeds of an ordinary life policy would then be income to the
beneficiary. 4  The entire amount of health insurance proceeds
would be considered income since a health insurance policy has no
cash surrender value. Disability insurance proceeds could be treated
like health insurance, and taxed completely, or they could be netted
against premiums paid. The CRTS recommends the latter.
Accretion $5,000 (assume $2,400 saved) plus Personal Consumption $5,000
$10,000 Income.
or
Accretion $2,600 plus Personal Consumption $7,400
(assume $2,400 spent) = $10,000 income.
40. Addition to personal consumption would result in an increased tax base, but'would
also increase complexity for taxpayers.
41. Assume: Family A $10,000 salary, $4,000 expenses, remainder of salary $6,000
saved.
Family B $15,000 salaries, $4,000 expenses, $5,000 housekeeping services, remain-
der of salaries $6,000 saved:
A Accretion $6,000 + Personal Consumption $4,000 = Income $10,000.
B. Accretion $6,000 + Personal Consumption (Total Consumption $9,000 - Business
Expenses $5,000) $4,000 = Income $10,000.
42. Assume A and B each have $10,000 salary, $5,000 living expenses (A $2,000 tuition)
$1,000 business expenses and each saves the remainder of his salary.
A Accretion $2,000 + Personal Consumption $7,000 = Income $9,000.
B Accretion $4,000 + Personal Consumption $7,000 = Income $11,000.
43. 1) If payable to the owner, proceeds are income only in excess of premiums and
interest. 2) If payable to another taxpayer, the entire proceeds are income and the owner-
taxpayer reports the decrease of the cash surrender value to zero.
May 1974]
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3) Fringe Benefits. The CTB takes into account fringe benefits
received by employees. The value of meals, uniforms, transportation,
recreation and other items furnished to employees are added in to
personal consumption. Other fringe benefits are included in the in-
come of employees as accretions to wealth. Employees will include
(under the present system of financing these programs) employer
contributions on their behalf to: social security, group life insurance,
health insurance, and retirement plans. Employees would also report
their share of current earnings under pension plans as accretion to
wealth.
4) Transfer Payments. Payments for public assistance, social sec-
urity, veterans' benefits, unemployment compensation are currently
not taxed.4 4 Exclusions are inconsistent with the Haig-Simons defi-
nition. These items will be included in the comprehensive tax base.
5) Interest on State and Local Bonds. Interest on state and local
bonds will be treated as accretion to wealth. This is an admittedly
controversial proposal, but exclusion of such interest from income is
not consistent with the model CTB. The tax law should not be used
to furnish incentives in regulating conduct. As stated by the CRTS,
direct aid to state and local governments is preferable to exclusion of
bond interest from income.
4 1
6) Capital Assets. The Haig-Simons definition draws no distinc-
tion between "capital" gains/losses and "ordinary" gains/losses.
Under the CTB, anything enhancing the taxable unit's capacity to
consume is included in the tax base in the year accrued as accretion
to wealth. The CTB taxpayer will have to make a yearly inventory
and valuation of assets. This will serve to simplify the tax system in
eliminating accelerated depreciation, depletion allowances and other
complex provisions.
the CTB, anything enhancing the taxable unit's capacity to consume
is included in the tax base in the year accrued as accretion to wealth.
The CTB taxpayer will have to make a yearly inventory and valua-
tion of assets. This will serve to simplify the tax system in elimina-
ting accelerated depreciation, depletion allowances and other
complex provisions.
There will be practical problems of implementation, including
liquidity, where large "paper profits" are realized. Hopefully, solu-
tions to these mechanical problems can be worked out.
B. Elimination of the Estate and Gift Taxes
Gifts, bequests, and inheritances are currently taxed in the form of
44. RFTS, supra note 20, at 23.
45. See note 20 supra.
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excise taxes on the privilege of transfer paid by the donor. The
recipient is not taxed on the transfer. This is obviously incompatible
with the Haig-Simons definition which forms the heart of the CTB
proposal. Under the CTB Model, any "private transfer" of wealth to
the taxpaying unit would be income (accretion to wealth), whether
by gift, bequest, or inheritance. Transfers within the taxpaying unit
would have no tax effect; e.g., a gift from father to his 10 year old
child. This of course can create "bunching" of large amounts of
income in one taxable year, and consequently unusually large tax
burdens for the taxpayer. Liberal income averaging provisions can
give relief in such situations.
C. Elimination of the Corporate Income Tax
Economists disagree as to where the incidence of the corporate
income tax lies. 46 The usual compromise solution is that about 50%
of the burden is shifted to the consumer, while 50% is borne by the
corporation (shareholders). Various schemes have been proposed for
attributing corporate income to the shareholders. We advocate, on
the basis of simplicity, reporting of corporate "income" directly by
the shareholders and elimination of the corporation as a taxpaying
entity. This would aid in greatly simplifying the IRC.
Shareholders would report as accretion to wealth actual dividends
received plus the increase/decrease in valuation of their shares during
the taxable year. The CRTS would retain the corporate income tax
as a means of collection. 4 ' Their proposal includes allowing to share-
holders a credit for tax paid on dividends at the corporate level. This
is needlessly complex.
Corporations can report valuations of shares to shareholders each
year, using procedures similar to those currently followed by mutual
funds. This presents no undue complexity to the taxpayer or to the
corporation. Liquidity, however, is a real problem to be dealt with.
Taxpayers may be required to pay taxes on corporate income which
was not in fact distributed to them. Deferred payment arrangements
could be used to correct this. The eventual result might be to en-
courage corporations to distribute more and retain less income.
Closely held corporations may present more difficult problems of
valuation and liquidity. If solutions become too complex, it may be
necessary to deviate from the Haig-Simons principle and suggest an
alternative method of taxing close corporations.
46. Pechman, supra note 12, at 111.
47. RFTS, supra note 20, at 16.
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D. The Family-Unit Taxpayer
This proposal adopts the family unit as the taxpayer. 4 8 Essentially
this means that persons claimed as dependents by other taxpayers
will not file separate returns. An individual must be self-supporting
to file as a taxpaying unit. All persons dependent on the same in-
come sources will be regarded as one taxpaying unit. In the usual
case this will be: Husband and/or wife and eligible dependents, or
single persons and eligible dependents. Eligible dependents, as de-
fined by the CRTS, 4 9 are unmarried children under 18 and living at
home or under 26 if attending school full-time.' 0
A family unit would file a single return. Transfers within the
family would have no effect on income.
E. Deductions
The formula ACCRETION + PERSONAL CONSUM-
PTION = INCOME yields "CTB INCOME". Although inconsistent
with the Haig-Simons definition, we propose that two deductions per
taxpayer unit be allowed to arrive at TAXABLE INCOME:"'
1) The first deduction would be for extraordinary expenses, ex-
pressed as expenses over a fixed percentage of CTB income.5 " This
deduction would include medical expenses 3 and other casualties.
This departure from the Haig-Simons formula is necessary to allow
for exceptional, unexpected expenses which can have crippling
effects on taxpayers.
2) A deduction per taxpayer unit will provide a minimum, subsis-
tence level of untaxed income. This deduction is also a means of
making the tax progressive. The amount of the deduction would vary
according to the number of persons in a taxpayer unit and their
status in the unit. Thus, if a one-person unit received a $2,000 deduc-
tion, a two-person unit would receive more than $2,000 but less than
$4,000, reflecting the savings in living together over living separately.
Similarly the difference between the credit for a six- and seven-per-
son unit would be quite small. The additional burden of a 5th child is
not nearly so great as that of the 1st child. The family taxpayer unit
deductions could be published in tables.
48. The family-unit taxpayer is also recommended by the CRTS and the Carter Com-
mission. 1 Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation 17 (1966).
49. RFTS, supra note 20, at 9.
50. We don't necessarily recommend this exact definition of the family unit.
51. Purists argue that no deviations from the inclusion CTB concept should be allowed.
Acknowledging that other deviations will be urged, these two limited deductions are pro-
posed.
52. The CRTS recommends 5%. See RFTS, supra note 20, at 23.
53. Medical expenses will not be included in this category once national health insurance
is in effect.
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The final formula for the CTB Model is:
ACCRETION + PERSONAL CONSUMPTION = CTB INCOME.
CTB INCOME - EXTRAORDINARY EXPENSES
DEDUCTION - TAXPAYER UNIT
DEDUCTION = TAXABLE INCOME.
F. The Rate Schedule
A progressive rate schedule would be applied to taxable income.
Only one rate schedule would be necessary. The CRTS proposed a
single rate schedule applicable to all taxpayers with rates ranging
from 4 to 54%14 which produces the revenue estimated to be pro-
54. This assumes that corporate tax is paid by the shareholders (no shifting). If full
shifting of corporate tax to the consumer is assumed, rates would be 4%-57%, as follows:
Taxable Incom
(Dollars)
Less Than 3,00
3,000- 4,00
4,000- 6,00
6,000- 8,00
8,000- 10,00
10,000- 12,00
12,000- 14,00
14,000- 16,00
16,000- 18,00
18,000- 20,00
20,000- 22,00
22,000- 24,00
24,000- 26,00
26,000- 28,00
28,000- 36,00
36,000- 38,00
38,000- 40,00
40,000- 44,00
44,000- 50,00
50,000- 52,00
52,000- 60,00
60,000- 64,00
64,000- 70,00
70,000- 76,00
76,000- 80,00
80,000- 88,00
88,000- 90,00
90,000-100,00
100,000 and ove
THE COMMISSION TAX RATE SCHEDULE
No-Shifting
e Tax Rate
(Percent)
0 -4*
0 4
0 7
0 10
10 13
'0 16
'0 18
0 20
10 24
0 27
'0 29
0 31
0 33
'0 35
'0 36
'0 37
'0 38
0 39
0 40
0 41
0 43
0 46
0 48
0 49
0 50
0 51
0 52
0 53
er 54
* Family unit credit.
RFTS, supra note 20, at 202.
Full-Shifting
Tax Rate
(Percent)
-4*
4
7
11
14
17
19
20
25
29
31
33
35
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
45
48
50
52
53
54
55
56
57
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duced under present individual income, corporate income, and estate
and gift taxes.' s
TABLE 3 6
FEDERAL REVENUE BY SOURCES 1971
Present Tax System Proposed System
Amount Percent Amount Percent
Source of Revenue ($Billions) of Total ($Billions) of Total
Individual Income Taxes* 87.4** 44.0 115.6 58.4
Corporate Income Taxes 31.5 16.0 0.0 0.0
Social Insurance Taxes 56.9 29.0 56.9 29.0
Excise Taxes 14.0 7.0 14.0 7.0
Estate and Gift Taxes 4.0 2.0 0.0 0.0
Customs Duties 2.7 1.3 2.7 1.2
Tax on Tax-exempt
Organizations 0.1 -- 7.3 3.6
Miscellaneous Recepts 1.5 0.7 1.6 0.8
Totals 198.1 100.0 198.1 100.0
* Provisions of 1971 Act affecting individuals are incorporated.
** Taxes after credits.
Source: Estimates based on Data Resources Incorporated Forecasts of the U.S. Economy,
September 29, 1971, and Treasury estimates.
The revenue impact of our CTB proposal can be illustrated by the
following table comparing adjusted gross income (AGI) with the
CRTS proposed tax base for 1971 :" 1
TABLE 4.s 8
RELATION BETWEEN TOTAL INCOME AND ADJUSTED
GROSS INCOME OF FILING HOUSEHOLDS UNDER THE COMMISSION PROPOSAL
AND PRESENT LAW, 1971
Billions of
Income or Deduction Item Dollars
Adjusted Gross Income (present law) 662.8
Adjustments --
plus-Corporate income accruing to stock held by
individuals 60.8
plus-Accrued gains on certain real estate 55.3
less-Dividends already in AGI -16.0
less-Portion of realized gain on capital assets
already in AGI -19.5
55. Id. at 78.
56. Id. at 191.
57. Id. at 195.
58. Comparisons are somewhat difficult because the CRTS proposed base includes
amounts presently considered separately as the base for the corporate income and estate
and gift taxes.
Adjusting the base to reflect deductions allowed taxpayers under the CRTS proposal and
the family unit credit, the actual CRTS tax base (what we call taxable income) would be
$882 billion. Under present law, 1971 estimates of the individual income tax base were
$415 billion. Id. at 56.
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TABLE 4 (continued)
Billions of
Income or Deduction Item Dollars
plus-Interest on life insurance policy reserves 4.9
plus-Life insurance death benefits in excess of
premiums and interest *
plus-Health and disability insurance benefits in
excess of costs 3.4
plus-Scholarships and fellowships 2.1
plus-Interest subsidies on college loans 0.1
plus-Fringe benefits (including employer contribution
for OASI) 66.6
plus-Benefits from OASI in excess of cost 17.2
plus-Unemployment compensation 2.9
plus-Veterans' benefits not presently taxable 5.6
plus-Interest on state and local securities 5.3
plus-Net imputed rent on owner occupied homes 18.3
plus-Cash gifts 4.2
plus-Bequests 16.8
plus-Depletion in excess of cost 0.3
plus-Statutory adjustments to gross income (moving
and business expenses and annuity premiums of
the self-employed) 6.9
Total Adjustments 225.7
Total income under Commission Proposal $898.5
* Less than $50 million.
The CTB would provide in this instance $225.7 billion more in
total income than present law. What this means to the taxpayer, is
reflected in Tables 5 and 6.
Under both assumptions as to the incidence of the corporate
income tax, taxpayers with incomes of up to $15,000 would pay less
tax under the CTB Model than they do under present law, and at
lower rates than those currently in effect. This greatly reduces the
problem of federal pre-emption and "opens up" the income tax for
greater ttilization by state and local governments.
REFORMING THE STATE AND LOCAL TAXING SYSTEM
A. The Need for Autonomy
Before attempting to develop a state and local model taxing
system to complement our proposed federal model, the need for
flexibility and taxing autonomy at the state and local level of govern-
ment should be emphasized. The concept of general revenue sharing
is not a solution to the state and local fiscal plight. Although general
revenue sharing was intended to provide much needed revenue to
state and local governments "with no strings attached," many gov-
ernmental units have been afraid to utilize the revenue sharing funds
May 1974]
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59. Id. at 203, assuming the burden of the corporate income tax is currently borne by
the shareholders.
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60. Id. at 204, assuming the entire burden of the corporate income tax is shifted to the
consumer.
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to meet long term needs (e.g. increased police protection). State and
local governmental units have voiced a realistic fear that dependence
on general revenue sharing funds will result in further loss of political
autonomy to the federal government. There can be no assurance that
the federal government will not attempt to force state and local
governments to "jump through the hoop" for general revenue sharing
funds sometime in the near future-as they presently are forced to do
in order to obtain categorical grants-in-aid and special revenue
sharing funds.
A taxing system must be flexible enough to provide the revenues
necessary to support the services required by citizens of the taxing
unit. Consequently, it is not who collects the revenues that is impor-
tant but rather who sets the rates. For example, state collection of
both state and local income taxes is recommended so long as the
citizens of each individual governmental unit can set the rates at
which they will be taxed.6
B. Political Reality in Developing a State and Local Taxing Model
It is senseless to describe a state and local taxing model which does
not opt for some balance of the property, sales and personal income
taxes. Although economists could certainly devise better taxing
systems for state and local governments than those that presently
exist, such systems would be politically unrealistic. Practical tax re-
form at the state and local level can only be accomplished by restruc-
turing existing tax systems. Changing existing systems would be
expensive and would meet with a great deal of political opposition
because each tax tends to benefit, and is thus supported by, different
economic and social sectors of the general public. Perhaps the great-
est barrier to basic change would be the overwhelming inertia of
governmental action at the state and local level.
For these reasons, the principal problem that a state and local
taxing model must solve is not which taxes should be utilized but
rather how they should be allocated. Consequently, we propose a
model which varies only slightly from that recommended by the
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (hereinafter
ACIR) in their excellent publication State and Local Finances: Sig-
nificant Features and Suggested Legislation. The ACIR was created
by President Eisenhower in 1959 to make recommendations to
national, state and local government in hopes of strengthening the
61. Presently, under the Federal-State Tax Collection Act of 1972, a state may elect to
have the federal government collect its income tax by means of a concept described as a
"piggy-back" system. See Federal Collection of State Income Taxes, tit. II, H.R. 14370,
92nd Cong. 2nd Sess. (1972).
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federal system. 6 2 The ACIR's proposals were based on the premise
that "a high quality state and local revenue system can be achieved
most effectively by shifting to the state primary responsibility for
financing education and by making balanced use of the three prime
tax measures-property, income and sales." 6 3
Our proposal borrows heavily from the ACIR recommendations
although it differs slightly in the allocation of the three prime tax
sources.6 " The following characteristics describe our proposed state
and local taxing model:
1) The state tax system should produce 70 to 80% of all state and
local tax revenues to enable it to finance most of the costs of public
elementary and secondary education as well as "traditional" state
programs.
2) The personal income tax should stand out as the single most
important source in the state and local tax system capable of pro-
ducing 30 to 40% of the total state and local tax revenue.6
Heavy reliance on the personal income tax would be compatible
with the concept of equity and would help to solve the pressing
problem of fiscal imbalance because of the elastic nature of the
income tax. Since "the burden distribution of the income tax, unlike
that of most taxes, can be predetermined, increased income tax
would enable political leadership to guide the distribution of a much
larger share of the state and local tax burden to accord with their
voters' preferences." 6 6 State and local income taxes should be char-
acterized by a high degree of conformity to the proposed federal
model. This conformity would make the utilization of a "piggy
back" system of collection between various levels of government
possible. So long as each governmental unit retains the right to set its
own rates, such a system of collection would not violate each level's
fiscal autonomy.
3) The general sales tax should serve as the other major state tax
source capable of producing up to 20% of total state and local tax
revenues without imposing an extraordinary burden on low income
families.
62. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Eleventh Annual Report 1
(1970).
63. State-Local Finances, supra note 10, at 3.
64. Id.
65. It should be noted that the ACIR study recommended that the personal income tax
should produce close to 25% of the total state and local tax revenues. However, the ACIR's
recommendation does not take into account any federal income tax rate reform. Under our
proposed federal income tax model, a substantial reduction in the rate structure is inev-
itable. Such a reduction makes possible our recommendation that the personal income tax
produce 30 to 40% of total state and local tax revenue.
66. Federal-State Coordination of Personal Income Taxes, supra note 5, at 11.
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The burden is a result of the inelastic6 1 nature of the tax.
Recommendations for combatting the regressivity of the sales tax
include exempting food or drugs from the sales tax base and imple-
menting an income tax credit. Utilization of a tax credit is preferable
because exemptions result in a large loss of revenue and are difficult
to administer. Exemptions create large revenue losses because they
apply to all taxpayers while tax credits can be limited to low income
taxpayers.
4) The local property tax should continue to serve as the principal
tax revenue source for local governmental units capable of producing
up to 20% of total state and local tax revenues. Local property taxes
should utilize uniform assessment rates and should not impose an
extraordinary burden on either elderly home owners or renters.
The concept of an income tax credit is a suitable solution to the
regressivity problem of the tax. The property tax lends itself to use
by local governmental units since it is a flexible broad-based tax,
easily administered at the local level6 8 and for which infinitely small
rate changes are possible. The property tax should be used to finance
local municipal-type functions rather than elementary and secondary
education. Such a step would give municipal and county govern-
ments a much needed substantial revenue source and, in addition,
would help to equalize the amount of resources available to each
public school pupil. Use of the property tax as the major source of
revenue for municipal functions would allow local citizens to in-
crease or decrease their local mill levy according to their need for
government services.
C A Coordinated Approach in Practice-The New Mexico Proposal
No state has developed a state and local taxing system which
satisfies all four characteristics of either our proposed model or the
ACIR recommendations. The following table is taken from the ACIR
study and shows the actual utilization of the personal income, gen-
eral sales, and property taxes by all the states and their respective
local governments during fiscal year 1970.69
The New Mexico tax system conforms to the first characteristic of
the state-local model. According to the ACIR figures, the State of
New Mexico produced 74.9% of the total state and local tax receipts.
The state presently bears most of the costs of public elementary and
67. An inelastic tax is not necessarily a bad thing. In times of recession or depression,
inelastic taxes such as the sales and property taxes decline more slowly than the economy.
For this reason, utilization of both elastic and inelastic tax sources is desirable.
68. But note that one study has concluded that the cost of efficient administration of
property assessment is prohibitive for cities of less than 40,000 population. Netzer, A
General Appraisal of the Institution, in Economics of the Property Tax, 164 (1966).
69. State-Local Finances, supra note 10, at 4.
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TABLE 7
THE "BIG THREE"-THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO TOTAL STATE-LOCAL
TAX RECEIPTS, 1970
State
Personal
Income
States Tax
UNITED STATES, Total 10.7%
Alabama 9.5
Alaska 25.8
Arizona 8.6
Arkansas 8.8
California 10.3
Colorado 14.0
Connecticut 0.3
Delaware 27.8
Dist. of Columbia 21.2
Florida
Georgia 12.9
Hawaii 23.8
Idaho 14.8
Illinois 10.6
Indiana 11.7
Iowa 9.1
Kansas 8.8
Kentucky 12.6
Louisiana 4.0
Maine 5.0
Maryland 21.9
Massachusetts 18.3
Michigan 10.3
Minnesota 20.6
Mississippi 6.7
Missouri 8.1
Montana 14.1
Nebraska 7.5
Nevada
New Hampshire 1.4
New Jersey 0.5
New Mexico 9.8
New York 21.1
North Carolina 17.1
North Dakota 6.6
Ohio
Oklahoma 6.5
Oregon 25.5
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island 4.8
South Carolina 13.4
South Dakota
Tennessee 1.1
Texas
Utah 15.4
Vermont 20.9
Virginia 17.9
Washington
West Virginia 7.6
Wisconsin 21.8
Wyoming
Source: ACIR staff computations, based on U.S. Bureau of the Census, Governmental
Finances in 1969- 70 and State Government Finances in 1970.
State
General
Sales
Tax
16.4%
23.8
23.0
22.5
15.7
14.9
17.6
18.2
27.9
23.5
36.9
16.8
18.6
20.5
18.1
16.4
27.8
13.8
22.0
12.5
6.0
20.5
11.6
34.8
21.5
12.7
21.7
11.1
23.5
8.5
16.7
18.5
18.0
12.0
20.0
20.2
27.1
18.0
22.0
15.6
22.9
8.2
13.3
36.2
34.6
12.1
21.5
State-Local
Property
Taxes
39.3%
15.2
24.4
38.9
25.8
46.9
42.7
49.2
18.6
32.7
34.0
30.5
17.2
36.4
41.2
47.0
48.9
51.2
22.9
19.8
45.7
32.4
50.3
40.3
38.7
24.1
40.1
54.3
52.6
34.4
62.3
54.1
22.6
36.4
25.3
46.6
47.2
30.5
47.2
29.5
40.5
22.4
55.0
27.5
40.5
36.0
34.9
28.3
35.1
23.3
43.4
47.5
Exhibit: State-Local
Tax Receipts, F.Y. 1970
Percent
Amount State
(millions) Collected
$86,823.7 55.2
891.1 73.7
126.0 68.1
753.9 62.9
484.0 72.6
11,160.4 49.2
924.1 50.8
1,470.0 50.4
246.6 79.3
390.9 -
2,355.7 60.3
1,431.0 65.7
440.6 77.2
247.6 62.9
5,410.1 53.0
1,854.6 54.0
1,232.7 50.9
887.5 48.5
962.7 73.0
1,205.9 69.5
377.7 54.9
1,890.6 57.2
2,828.3 49.2
4,043.0 58.0
1,681.7 60.7
655.7 74.0
1,603.3 51.1
276.3 46.6
588.3 44.4
252.4 59.0
245.6 38.5
3,206.0 41.5
365.1 74.9
11,899.1 51.4
1,580.1 75.3
232.1 52.4
3,656.3 46.5
782.7 64.1
836.1 51.5
4,734.1 58.6
387.6 59.0
710.4 76.5
265.2 42.4
1,096.2 62.6
3,540.7 55.7
396.9 63.3
209.3 64.5
1,581.5 60.4
1,510.1 68.0
525.2 73.3
2,246.6 59.3
144.1 58.6
May 1974]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
secondary education." This arrangement appears to have resulted
from actions that were taken nearly 40 years ago. In 1933, a 20 mill
limitation on the property tax was added to the New Mexico Con-
stitution.7 1 The 20 mill limit eliminated the possibility of increasing
school financing by means of the property tax. Consequently two
years later, an act was passed creating an emergency school tax,7 2 or
gross receipts tax as it is now called.7 Since the gross receipts tax is
collected at the state level, the responsibility for financing public
schools has become principally a function of state government in
New Mexico.
New Mexico falls far short of compliance with our second cri-
terion. The state's personal income tax7 4 contributed only 9.8% of
total state and local collections in fiscal year 1970. We feel that the
personal income tax should replace the gross receipts tax as the
principal source of tax revenue at the state level. The sales tax rate
can be lowered (to perhaps 3%) and the lost revenues can be replaced
by increasing the state's personal income tax rates. Hopefully, the
income tax will produce between 30 and 40% of total state and local
revenues.7" Although an income tax rate increase is politically
impossible by itself, a proposal which would lower the sales tax while
increasing the income tax might fare better at the polls. Even if the
base and rates of both taxes were not altered, the personal income
tax would eventually replace the gross receipts tax as New Mexico's
principal tax source due to the income tax's significantly higher elas-
ticity. 7 6
New Mexico's current gross receipts tax 7 7 produces more general
sales tax revenue than the third recommendation requires. In fiscal
year 1970, New Mexico's gross receipts contributed 23.5% of the
total state and local tax revenues. A reduction of the sales tax (to
perhaps 3%) as recommended above would bring general sales re-
ceipts in New Mexico within the suggested figure of 20% of total
70. The National Education Association estimated that state government in New Mexico
contributed 63.4% of the funds used for public elementary and secondary schools for fiscal
year 1970-71 while local governments contributed 20%. National Education Association,
Research Division, Estimate of School Statistics, 1970-71, (Wash., D.C., NEA Publication).
71. N.M. Const. art. 8, § 2.
72. N.M. Stat. Ann. ch. 72, art. 16 (Repl. 1961) (repealed 1966).
73. Jett, New Mexico Tax Structure and the ACIR Recommendations, N.M. Bus., Nov.,
1972, at 4.
74. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 72-15A-1 to 72-15A-15 (Supp. 1973).
75. It is beyond the scope of this article to suggest the actual rate structure that would
be necessary to effectuate such a percentage increase.
76. It is estimated that if both taxes remained undisturbed, it would take about 30 years
for the personal income tax to catch up with the gross receipts tax. Jett, supra note 73, at 5.
77. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 72-16A-1 to 72-16A-19 (Supp. 1973).
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state and local tax revenues. The comprehensive low income tax
credit 7 8 passed by the New Mexico Legislature in 1972 is an accept-
able solution to the regressive character of both the gross receipts
and the property taxes. The credit is designed to alleviate the regres-
sive effect of the overall tax structure on low income persons. The
credit based on income has two distinct advantages over exempting
food or drugs from gross receipts or returning a flat credit per per-
son. First, it is the least expensive anti-regressivity measure in terms
of revenues lost. Second, it confines tax relief strictly to those low
income individuals who are subject to the regressivity of the tax
system. "
New Mexico's property tax 80 revenues slightly exceed the limits
set by the fourth recommendation. As the ACIR figures show, 22.6%
of the total tax collections in New Mexico arise from the property
tax. Article VIII Section 2 of the New Mexico Constitution presently
limits taxes levied on property to 20 mills annually but allows for
additional taxes to be levied outside of the limitation upon approval
by the electorate of the taxing district. In fiscal year 1970-71, the
average property tax mill levy in New Mexico was 35.41 due to the
additional authorized special levies. 8 ' The use of these special levies
as a means of debt financing points out the difficulties that local
governments are experiencing in collecting sufficient revenues in
order to operate. Consequently, it is recommended that the state's
authorized mill levy be shifted to local counties and municipali-
ties.8 2
New Mexico utilizes a uniform assessment ratio of 33-1/3%. Al-
though a higher uniform ratio would be preferable, an increase in the
assessment ratio would circumvent the intent of the 20 mill limit. As
discussed earlier, the comprehensive tax credit utilized in New
Mexico is an adequate solution to the burden placed on elderly home
owners and renters by property taxes. While its comprehensive
nature doesn't permit relief tied specifically to excessive property tax
burdens, the property tax system is included in the overall credit
system. 3
78. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-15A-11.1 (Supp. 1973).
79. For further explanation of the low income tax credit, see G. Boyle, A Comprehensive
Tax Credit for Achieving Proportionality in State and Local Tax Structures (privately cir-
culated work 1972).
80. N.M. Stat. Ann. ch. 72, arts. 1 and 2 (Repl. 1961, Supp. 1973).
81. Jeff, supra note 73, at 6.
82. Under the new "property tax code" which will become effective 1 January, 1975,
the state would be authorized to levy 3.35 mills of the total 20 mill limit. N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 72-30-7 (special 1973 Supp.).
83. Jett, supra note 73, at 7.
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CONCLUSION
It is our thesis that meaningful tax reform can only be accom-
plished by considering federal, state and local systems as a whole. In
hopes of furthering that thesis we have proposed an intergovern-
mental approach to tax reform.
At the federal level, the reform proposal includes 1) a comprehen-
sive tax base, 2) elimination of the estate and gift taxes, 3) elimina-
tion of the corporate income tax, 4) establishment of the family unit
as the taxpayer, 5) a minimum deduction per family and 6) a
reduced rate schedule. It is hoped that decreasing federal income tax
rates would enable state and local taxing systems to utilize a similar
broad-based income tax as the principal source of tax revenues. Such
reform would help to solve the pressing problem of intergovern-
mental fiscal imbalance.
At the state level, we have developed a reform proposal which
designates use of the personal income and general sales taxes by the
state government while shifting the primary responsibility for fin-
ancing education from local to state government. Such a shift would
enable local governmental units to make a greater utilization of the
property tax to pay for municipal-type functions.
Admittedly these proposals leave many points unresearched and
undiscussed. Looking at the combined federal, state and local taxing
systems as a whole makes a great deal of sense. It is hoped that our
proposed models will encourage further work in this area.
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